The purpose of the ISCL is to encourage the comparative study of law and legal systems and to seek affiliation with individuals and organisations with complimentary aims. We were established in June 2008 and are recognised by the International Academy of Comparative Law.

Saturday, May 19, 2012

Enforcing Bilateral Promises: A Comparative Law and Economics Perspective

Parties often exchange promises of future performance with one another. Legal systems frame and regulate contracts involving the exchange of bilateral promises of future performance differently from one another. Two conceptual and practical questions often arise in these bilateral situations. Should a breaching promisor be allowed to force the performance of his non-breaching promisee? Should a breaching party be able to collect damages in a contract if his counterpart was also in breach? This paper examines these interrelated questions from a comparative law and economics perspective. We consider contracts in which parties make reciprocal promises of performance and study the incentives created by applying a defense of non-performance in unilateral breach cases and the “plaintiff in default” preclusion rules in bilateral breach cases.

Parisi, Francesco, Cenini, Marta and Luppi, Barbara, Enforcing Bilateral Promises: A Comparative Law and Economics Perspective (January 9, 2012). Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-03.